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About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/ 
Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
 
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
the different component parts of the new Mexican energy sector from a legal standpoint. 
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Introduction* 
 
This compilation comprises a diverse set of papers regarding the primary issues raised by 
the Mexican energy reform of 2013–2014. Some of the chapters address technical topics; 
others refer to more general problems related to social, political, economic, and legal 
issues—such as public safety and the deterioration of the environment—which represent 
equal challenges to the success of the reform. Nevertheless, all of them allude, explicitly or 
otherwise, to the capacity of the Mexican state with its authority and its organizations to 
oversee the complex operation of the energy reform in order to ensure its positive 
contribution to the country’s economic growth and sustainable development over the 
coming decades. The challenge that the energy reform poses for Mexico is, above all, a 
challenge for its institutions—not only for those directly in charge of regulating the energy 
sector, but also those who maintain the political and legal fabric of the country. The rule of 
law is necessary to provide certainty to domestic and foreign economic players, as well as 
guarantee the conditions of sustainability that are required for the country’s development. 
 
Without addressing the topics of the different chapters in more detail, this introduction 
aims to examine—in light of Mexico’s historical trajectory as an independent nation—the 
idea of the “challenge to the institutions,” since this may be considered a common and 
transversal thread that provides meaning and coherence to the set of papers making up this 
volume. The thesis is that the construction of the Mexican state is still incomplete, and the 
prospects for its success depend not only upon the decisions currently taking place on the 
horizon of world society, but also upon the path that process has taken in the past. 
Therefore, it is essential to pose the question of institutional effectiveness within Mexico’s 
historical and evolutionary context. 
 
There is ample literature that addresses the capacities and effectiveness of institutions. This 
is a subject that concerns international financial organizations, such as the World Bank or 
the International Monetary Fund, when granting loans and assistance to developing 
countries, since they trust that the beneficiaries will have the capacity both to carry out the 
agreed-upon projects and to minimize the risk of losing money due to inefficiency and 
corruption. However, the leaders of these countries—whether or not they have a genuine 
interest in the successful development of their nations—are also concerned with knowing 
whether they will have the necessary materials and human resources, as well as 
institutional capabilities, at their disposal to face the challenges of a world society. These 
challenges frequently arise unexpectedly from external sources, which can include natural 
disasters, economic crises, and epidemics. In other cases, the challenges are associated with 
changes and reforms that governments choose to adopt voluntarily as part of their internal 
political program, although these also frequently occur during situations of crisis and 
under strong internal and external pressures. 
 
																																																								
* This essay has benefited from comments and suggestions by Stephen Zamora and an anonymous 
reviewer. 
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Mexico’s situation after 1982 is a good example. Stricken by a deep financial crisis, the 
government of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) determined that a “change of 
course”1 to set a new basis for the development of the country could no longer be 
postponed. In economic matters, the new course involved the promotion of growth by 
incorporating the Mexican economy into the global market through exports and private 
investments that were mainly of foreign origin. One central piece of this strategy was the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that was agreed upon by Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada and went into in effect on January 1, 1994. In political matters, a 
gradual democratic opening took place, characterized by the increase of pluralism and 
alternation between the political parties in power at different levels of government. At the 
intersection of these two processes lay the need to establish a true rule of law based on 
respect for legality and human rights. 
 
The “change of course” that started in 1982 and the energy reform of 2013–2014 are a part 
of this process, which has yet to be completed. Indeed, some goals appear to be further out 
of reach now than at the start. There is a widespread impression that the gap between the 
challenges in establishing social harmony by means of civil society rules and the 
institutional capabilities to resolve such challenges is not only permanent, but will actually 
increase. Why is this? A part of the answer is offered by the concept of “world society,” 
which has been elaborated upon by authors such as John W. Meyer and Niklas Luhmann 
using different theoretical perspectives. According to these scholars, it is not nation-states 
and their relations with each other that build today’s globalized world beyond their 
borders; rather, it is the structure and institutionalized culture of world society that define 
the main requirements and the parameters within which national policies operate, 
independent of whether the state in question has the capacity to carry out such policies. 
 
In the case of the energy reform of 2013–2014, there is no doubt that to a large degree, its 
success depends on meeting a global standard of managing and regulating the country’s 
energy resources in order to attract the capital and investments needed for their efficient 
exploitation. Mexico certainly does not control the global market, which—like the 
international prices for oil and gas—may change in a capricious manner. However, what 
does lie within its power is taking measures that will increase the probability of the reform’s 
success. The country is not facing the same dramatic situation as in 1982, but although 
many of the changes implemented since then have resulted in conditions that are 
advantageous compared with those of other nations, its institutions are fragile—due in part 
to their relative novelty, and also to the growing complexity of the political and legal 
environment in which they are developing.  
 
This paper is divided into four sections. First, we will briefly address some relevant 
theoretical ideas on the topics of the state’s institutional capacity and the effectiveness of 
the legal system. For this purpose, we will employ a schematic reference of the concept of 
“world society” as explained by John W. Meyer and others, keeping in mind that a global 
society is a factor in the functioning of the nation-state, and not just an external or 
contextual space in which a nation-state is embedded.  
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The second section provides a summary of the main stages of state-building that have 
occurred since Mexico’s independence. This construction has been linked with what we 
may call “modernizing cycles” of the legal system. In order to elucidate the context that 
surrounded the energy reform of 2013–2014, in this section we will offer a description of 
the most recent of these cycles, which began in 1982. This cycle is characterized by the 
creation of new institutions and changes to existing ones, as well as by the growth and 
increasing complexity of the normative apparatus at both the legislative and judicial levels.  
 
The third section proposes a consideration of some institutional challenges that are posed 
by the energy reform. Specifically, we first examine the role of the executive branch vis-a-
vis other institutions and its unique relationship with the regulatory organizations in the 
energy sector. Second—taking into account both the legal complexity of the energy reform 
as well as of the judicial apparatus itself—we examine the unique role that the courts will 
need to play in the resolution of all kinds of difficult issues that arise during the process of 
implementing the reform. 
 
The fourth section contains some brief final thoughts. There, we conclude that although 
the formation of the state, of a culture of legality, and of democratic accountability occurs 
simultaneously and has yet to be completely achieved—which does generate considerable 
uncertainty regarding future success—there are also signs that the past transformations 
have been profound and, to a large extent, irreversible. This conclusion leads us to the 
moderately optimistic assessment that, although there is a steep learning curve, Mexico has 
most of the institutional pieces in place that are required to overcome this difficulty. In 
particular, there are undoubtedly signs that the Mexican ruling class responds not only to 
its own interests but also to the scrutiny and pressures coming from civil, national, and 
international society. This fact makes it likely that over the long term, the reform will take 
an efficient and proper course. 
 
World Society as the Horizon for the Development of the State  
and the Law  
 
In the 1970s, John W. Meyer and his collaborators began developing a neo-institutionalist 
framework that conceptualizes world society (which they initially called world polity) as a 
global culture (see, for example, Meyer et al. 1997). This framework identifies a visible 
convergence in the development of nation-states, which is explained by the global 
institutionalization of a transnational culture that was essentially formed with the 
secularization of Christianity. The world society represents the central criterion of the 
legitimacy of these states and has effects in fields that are very different from politics: 
education, health, science and technology, gender equality, and constitutional framework 
and legal order (Greve and Heintz 2005). 
 
This transnational culture—which promotes rationality, justice, progress, and 
individualism as central values—is codified in international treaties and agreements and is 
rendered operational through action plans that are implemented in different countries via 
State-building, the Modernization of the Legal System, and Institutional Effectiveness 
 7 
a dense network of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. This focus does not 
ignore the fact that the structural similarities between states and their policies exist on a 
formal plane while the factual inequalities occur at the level of social reality—inequalities 
that may remain the same or even increase. However, the fact that the gap exists does not 
prove an obstacle to the dissemination and adoption of transnational culture on the local 
level (Greve and Heintz 2005). 
 
The theories regarding world society2 have interesting consequences for the 
conceptualization of the state, the law, and institutions in general, as well as for their 
mutual relations under the current conditions of globalization. The first implication is that 
the institution of the state itself has become globalized over the entire planet in such a manner that, 
currently, there is practically no territory that does not belong to the sovereign realm of a 
state. Meyer and his colleagues assume that world society submits states to strong pressures 
to achieve their conformity with certain minimum standards of governability of their 
territories. The states adopt the institutions and policies that are a part of the worldwide 
culture of modernity (“isomorphism”), because their political legitimacy depends on them. 
This adoption occurs despite the fact that for the majority, a gap emerges between the 
demands and expectations of the world society and the internal capabilities of each state to 
respond to these expectations (Meyer et al. 1997). 
 
Regarding the law, these authors start with the premise that a legal culture exists on a global 
level. In an extensive essay co-written with Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Meyer develops the legal 
implications of his vision of world society. Modern law, they write, is formed through the 
secularization of principles and values of an essentially religious type, which arose in 
Western civilizations and which have been globalized through the nation-state: “Thus, legal 
systems are a constitutive element of that form of society known as the nation-state. The 
two arose concomitantly, each lending legitimacy to the other. National legal systems 
emerged more through the global system than through local organization” (Boyle and 
Meyer 2002, 68). 
 
Boyle and Meyer also point out that the vision of the nation-states as secular players that 
make legal decisions in an autonomous manner is erroneous, because it ignores the 
supranational character of the law: 
The rise of the state indeed essentially destroyed the organizational authority 
of the church, but it did so, in our view, by absorbing, and thus becoming 
dependent on, a secularized version of the wider culture carried by the 
church. The processes are dialectical and continue throughout modern 
history. In claiming autonomy and sovereignty under various secularized 
principles of rationality and universality, both the nation-state and the law 
that is partially its creation intensify their dependence on these secularized 
principles. (Boyle and Meyer 2002, 69)  
 
World society offers particular conditions that promote the quick diffusion of legal ideas and 
institutions. Meyer and Boyle emphasize the fact that states generate legitimacy to the extent 
that they respond to universal principles, and the law becomes an important symbol of the 
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acceptance of these principles. Legal science and legal professionals—primarily attorneys 
and judges—actively participate in the circulation of ideas and legal institutions such as 
human rights, due to the universal scenarios on which they are based and despite the 
diversity of conditions and practices to which they apply (Boyle and Meyer 2002, 74 et seq.). 
 
What degree of effectiveness should be expected from the legal system on the horizon of 
world society? First and foremost, it is difficult to achieve the “Western ideal” of the rule of 
law—which we understand as a system of government and social relations guided primarily 
by legal standards and values—particularly in those societies whose regulations have 
essentially formed through “transplants” and “imports,” as in the case of Mexico. For Boyle 
and Meyer, the role of the law in world society is not functional or repressive, but rather 
depends on the links it creates with principles of universal culture and as a source of the 
identity and legitimacy of individuals and nations; as a result, one should not expect a high 
level of correspondence between the law and action, but rather an “extreme decoupling” with 
regard to social life (Boyle and Meyer 2002, 66-67 and 81 et seq.). The disconnect is neither 
an accident nor strictly a “deficiency” of legal culture, but a central element of the national 
project and a characteristic of any rationalized organization, to the extent that the rules that 
govern it—as is the case with legal standards—respond to external ideals. 
The decoupled character of legal systems is sometimes (and rather 
reasonably) taken to be an indicator of their ineffectiveness and functional 
unimportance. This may be realistic in dealing with some traditional legal 
systems, but misses important points in approaching the modern one. The 
modern system is decoupled precisely because it is so linked to universal 
models and standards, despite the limited and variable character of local 
social life.  (Boyle and Meyer 2002, 82-83) 
 
In summary, although these ideas regarding world society are situated at a high level of 
abstraction and generality, they offer an initial and relevant perspective from which to 
identify the institutional challenges of the 2013–2014 energy reform in Mexico. Based on 
these ideas, it can be asserted that some of the deficiencies and weaknesses that are 
observed in the legal system and institutions in Mexico have their origin in world society. 
They are a result of the demands that world society continually imposes on the Mexican 
state as an integral part of the global order, as well the institutional proposals that exist to 
respond to these demands. 
 
As we will see in the following section, the construction of the Mexican state has been 
carried out over different stages and through different modernizing cycles of the legal 
system. These stages and cycles precipitated a gradual opening toward the outside world, 
which has permitted the incorporation of new institutions intended to respond to the 
expectations of the global culture at any given time. When they are first incorporated, such 
institutions may be revealed to be ineffective and dysfunctional, expanding the gap 
between the ideal standard and social reality. This is because any institutional innovation, 
regardless of its origin, is incorporated within a political and legal apparatus already in 
operation, into which it must be integrated and adapted gradually. A long period of 
acculturation and learning is required so that the new institutions can function in a 
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reasonably efficient manner; however, by then, it is very likely that the demands facing the 
institutional apparatus have changed once again. 
 
The Construction of the Mexican State and the Modernizing Cycles of the 
Legal System 
 
The energy reform of 2013–2014 faces international challenges that cannot be fully 
understood without reference to history. In this section, we will provide a summary of the 
major stages of Mexican state-building, as well as the major cycles of legal modernization 
that accompanied them. 
 
The 19th Century 
For almost 50 years after achieving independence in 1821, Mexico’s political scene was 
characterized by extreme instability as a result of the ongoing struggle to define political 
and constitutional rules. Indeed, the initial consensus in 1824 in favor of a presidential and 
federal republic—which was modeled to a large extent on the Constitution of the United 
States—was promptly followed by disenchantment and the division of the political realm 
into factions that became increasingly irreconcilable. As a result of near-constant military 
revolts and episodes of dictatorial rule, power shifted between centralists and federalists 
from 1824 to 1867. These shifts were marked by profound antagonism that was generated 
between these factions with regard to the relationship between the state and the Roman 
Catholic Church. While conservatives considered religion a central factor of identity and 
did not wish to substantially change the colonial arrangement that had sustained it to that 
point, liberals attempted to emancipate society, education, and the economy from the 
ecclesiastical domain. However, both factions were promoting the implementation of a 
republican regime that was, all things considered, quite far removed from the “uses and 
customs” of the colonial society they were intending to overcome.3  
 
In 1857, as a result of another revolution, a moderate, liberal constitution was promulgated. 
Like the majority of its predecessors, this constitution promptly caused a rebellion that led 
to a brutal civil war (the War of the Reform, 1857–1860) and later to a failed attempt to 
establish an empire (1864–1867) with the support of France. Out of these struggles, the 
Liberal Party ultimately emerged as the victor. During the War of Reform and the 
following years, laws were enacted that began the process of expropriating rural property, 
in addition to establishing full separation between church and state. As a result, the 
Mexican state not only affirmed its independence and sovereignty over its territory, but 
also its power over the actual land as the principal source of national wealth. 
 
The destiny of the Constitution of 1857 was paradoxical. On one hand, it had a long and 
eventful life until the rupture of the constitutional order by General Victoriano Huerta in 
1913, triggering the second armed phase of the Mexican Revolution. However, the 
victorious faction of this struggle—that of Venustiano Carranza—did not propose replacing 
the Constitution of 1857 but rather adopted it as its banner and the basis for the 
Constitution of 1917. On the other hand, the presidents had great difficulties governing 
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under it and therefore believed themselves obliged to openly ignore it, attempt to reform 
it, or cease to apply it, all the while publicly pledging allegiance to it, as during the long rule 
of General Porfirio Díaz (1876–1880 and 1884–1911). 
 
The first stage of nation-state building and the first modernizing cycle of the Mexican legal 
order culminated with Porfirio Díaz (Roeder 2013; Garner 2010; Margadant 1971, chapter 
VIII; Fix-Fierro 2015). The disorder and instability of the political and constitutional rule 
during the first seven decades of the 19th century hindered the construction of a 
centralized national power that could effectively promote institutional consolidation and 
economic development. Political life had been dominated by elites and caciques—local 
political bosses—in states that were primarily defending their local interests, not those of 
the newly formed nation. 
 
General Díaz succeeded in subjecting all these interests and sources of local power under 
his absolute authority through a policy that combined a firm hand and the strong bonds of 
personal loyalty. His success in centralizing power catalyzed a period of order and stability 
that favored economic development—through the construction of infrastructure for 
communications such as railways and telephone and telegraph lines—and industrialization, 
mainly supported by foreign capital. One of the industries that started to be developed 
during his government was the oil industry (Álvarez de la Borda 2005). 
 
The administration of General Díaz proposed several amendments to the 1857 Constitution 
in order to transfer matters previously within the states’ jurisdiction to federal authority. 
This included sectors that were important for economic development, such as commerce 
and mining. Based on these new powers, the Mexican Congress enacted several laws that 
made it possible to formulate and apply a national policy in such matters for the first time. 
The new legislation not only covered the sectors of economic and commercial activity, but 
also finally completed the process of the codification and replacement of the colonial laws 
(Vera Estañol 1994). The issuance of codes and laws in matters of justice was also 
particularly significant, although critiques of their function intensified at the end of the 
period (Cossío Díaz 2014). 
 
The regime of General Díaz ended not only because he was unable to institutionalize his 
personal power and thus resolve the issue of the peaceful and orderly succession to the 
presidency, but also because he closed the space for independent political participation and 
excluded the masses from the benefits of economic development. Nonetheless, the tasks of 
Mexican state-building and the modernization of the legal system continued vigorously as 
soon as the armed phase of the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) ended. The new regime 
turned out to be as authoritarian as the former, although it at least managed to resolve the 
problem of the peaceful transfer of power. It also succeeded, to some extent, in involving 
some social groups that had been excluded during the dictatorship of Díaz, such as farmers 
and the incipient working class, in the development process. Over time, the new regime 
would face its own crisis of legitimacy and the need to submit to the pressure of world 
society—a period of reform and transition that still has not concluded. 
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The 20th Century 
The Constitution of 1917 has been the longest lasting in Mexican constitutional history. It 
set the institutional basis for contemporary Mexico and has been adapted to respond to the 
profound transformations of the country over the past century. 
 
In the draft of the Constitution that he presented for deliberation and approval by the 
Constitutional Congress of Querétaro, President Venustiano Carranza conducted an 
assessment of the errors of the Constitution of 1857 and the evils of dictatorship. Among 
other remedies, he proposed strengthening presidential power. In Carranza’s eyes, only a 
strong president—though not a despotic one—would be able to maintain order and 
guarantee freedom at the same time. However, the basis for the creation of the hegemonic 
presidency—which lasted almost the entirety of the 20th century and, by providing 
stability, allowed for the economic, social, and legal modernization of Mexico—was not 
solely the powers granted by the Constitutional Congress, but also included two additional 
factors. 
 
The first is related to the functioning of the state models that were reflected by the 
Constitution of 1917. There, three state models came together: the “liberal state,” inherited 
from the Constitution of 1857; the “central state,” which had begun to be built during the 
government of General Díaz; and the “social state,” which started to emerge when Congress 
enshrined the rights of workers and farmers in the constitutional text (González and 
Caballero 2002). However, the central government during the Revolution would not have 
been able to become the dominant factor of national development over the following 
decades without Article 27 of the Constitution. This article states that all land and water 
within the nation’s territory—as well as the natural resources in the subsoil—belong to the 
state, which would have the right to approve or reject their exploitation, and also to impose 
limits on and determine the rules associated with different modalities of private ownership. 
The importance of this article is evident when we remember that during the regime of 
Porfirio Díaz, the opposing principle was established: the natural resources of the subsoil—
mainly oil, but not other minerals such as gold and silver—were owned by whoever had 
ownership of the surface. Article 27 reversed this principle and “nationalized” these 
resources, creating an extended conflict between the Mexican state and foreign oil 
companies—and the governments of their respective countries—that argued against any 
retroactive application of the new Constitution. On this basis, the United States refused to 
recognize the first governments after the Mexican Revolution; acknowledgement was 
finally achieved through the Bucareli Treaty of 1923.4 
 
The second factor was the creation of a political party whose purpose was not to compete 
for power but rather to preserve and monopolize it by involving and disciplining the 
revolutionary forces, which were still prone to settling conflicts through armed violence. 
Therefore, in 1929, the National Revolutionary Party (the predecessor of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party [abbreviated PRI in Spanish]), was created through the initiative of 
General Plutarco Elías Calles, who had been president of the republic from 1924 to 1928. 
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The institutionalization of the hegemonic presidency beginning with the government of 
General Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) was supported by the combination of the central 
state and social state models, the “deactivation” of the liberal model,5 and the creation of 
corporatist organizations—mainly composed of workers and farmers—closely linked with 
the so-called “official party.” In this environment of intense worker-based nationalism, the 
expropriation of the oil industry from the hands of foreign companies was decreed on 
March 18, 1938, following a labor conflict.6 
 
As during General Díaz’s dictatorship, the president of the republic succeeded in once 
again elevating himself above the other federal powers and the state governments. To do 
so, he employed the tool of constitutional amendment, which increased the concentration 
of power in the hands of the federal government—in matters such as labor, education, and 
agriculture—as well as mechanisms for political control. This control reinforced the role 
that the president was actually performing: that of the primary legislator. Until 1938, 
following an irregular practice that had originated in the 19th century and whose use had 
been amplified by General Díaz, it was customary for Congress to delegate extraordinary 
powers to the executive branch to enact laws that were perfectly ordinary, such as the Civil 
Code for the Federal District in 1928. 
 
With time, the president also became the center of economic regulation, particularly after 
the implementation of the model of “import substitution.” His economic power was 
strengthened even further through the creation of economic monopolies for state 
companies, such as Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) and the Federal Electricity Commission 
(CFE). Even more so through “fiscal coordination,” the federal government was also 
gradually concentrating the main taxation powers out of the hands of local and state 
governments, although it was required to share some federal income with them. 
 
During the first decades of the 20th century, an important modernization cycle of Mexican 
law took place, largely related to the implementation of new political and social directives 
resulting from the Constitution of 1917. This cycle spanned approximately 20 years, from 
1925 through 1945. It did not start immediately after the promulgation of the Constitution 
in 1917, since political instability lasted several years more. Even though it is not possible 
here to summarize all the legal and institutional changes that occurred during this period, 
it should be briefly pointed out that at the same time that the common, civil, and criminal 
legislation was renewed, a broad set of new laws were enacted—particularly labor, 
commercial, and financial laws—some of which, although heavily amended, continue to be 
in force and effect up to the present day. Likewise during this stage, some highly important 
institutions were created, such as the Bank of Mexico (1925) and the Mexican Social 
Security Institute (1943). 
 
Reform and Transition on the Threshold of the 21st Century 
At the end of the 1960s, some signs of the decay of the import-substitution economic 
model became apparent, along with the first signs of political crisis. Various social 
movements, such as those spearheaded by the railway workers at the end of the 1950s and 
by doctors and students in the 1960s, indicated that traditional corporatism was no longer 
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able to respond to the new demands of the working and middle classes primarily located in 
the nation’s cities. The crisis, both economic and political, deepened during the 1970s and 
inevitably exploded at the start of the 1980s. A “change of course” was necessary. 
 
Economically, this change consisted of the liberalization and full incorporation of the 
Mexican economy into the global market, triggering the third cycle of legal modernization 
that has lasted until today. Mexico not only joined the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs in 1986 but also rather audaciously decided to negotiate NAFTA with the United 
States and Canada. This treaty became the cornerstone of the modernization of Mexico’s 
economic, commercial, and financial legislation from 1991 to 1997 (López Ayllón 1997), as 
well as a guarantor of the stability and continuity of the new economic policy. 
 
Even though the regime intended to maintain its political control while making some 
concessions to democratic liberalization, the controversial presidential elections in 1988 
forced President Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) to negotiate and accept changes to the 
electoral system, which would eventually lead to the presidency being won by a party other 
than the PRI in 2000. Another contributing factor to changes in Mexico’s political system 
was the end of the Cold War, which resulted in stricter foreign scrutiny of the Mexican 
government’s internal policy. Within the framework of the negotiations and approval of 
NAFTA, severe criticism was raised—particularly in the United States—of Mexico’s political 
system and institutions due to the absence of democracy and the true rule of law. These 
pressures drove new changes, among them the judicial reform carried out by President 
Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) (Fix-Fierro 2003). 
 
The moderation of presidential power is mainly the result of the strengthening of the 
legislative and judicial branches and a certain deconcentration in favor of state-level 
entities (“new federalism”), as well as the creation of organizations with constitutional 
autonomy (known as “autonomous constitutional organizations”). These organizations 
have been formed in large part through the delegation of the administrative powers of the 
federal executive branch. This development was based on the assumption that effective 
control and balance between the branches of power required the establishment of new 
autonomous, impartial, and professional public organizations. 
 
Most of the changes promoted during this third period of legal modernization were 
reflected in the constitutional text. Two-thirds of all constitutional changes—and more 
than half of the decrees of reform—have come after 1982. The presidential terms of Felipe 
Calderón (2006–2012) and Enrique Peña Nieto (2012–present) had the largest number of 
reforms (Soberanes Díez 2015; also see Table 1 in the appendix). 
 
The dynamics of constitutional reform are also characterized by the incorporation of 
increasingly extensive rules. The Constitution is now three times longer than the original 
1917 text (see Table 1 in the appendix), which appears to be indicative of a new political 
dynamic. Aside from the occasions when constitutional reform was the result of the more or 
less unilateral decisions made by the president, current constitutional changes are based on 
agreements between the national political parties. These parties have strong incentives to 
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include the specific details of such agreements in the constitutional text to protect them—
given the rules of ordinary legislative majorities—and avoid having their constitutionality 
challenged in the courts. Nonetheless, these agreements are not always permanent, as is 
shown in a paradigmatic manner by the frequent changes to electoral rules. 
 
The dynamics of constitutional reform have not only been quantitative but also qualitative, 
since practically all matters included in the constitutional text have been modified; the 
number of national bodies, along with their organization and system incorporated into the 
political constitution, has been expanded in a particularly significant manner (see Table 2 
in the appendix).  
 
The passage of new federal laws has also been extensive (see Table 3 in the appendix). 
Among the laws in force as of August 31, 2015, three-quarters were enacted after 1982, more 
than two-thirds came after 1988, and nearly half were enacted after 2000. Over a quarter of 
all laws in force were enacted from 2009 to 2015. As of November 30, 2000, there were 218 
federal laws in force and effect; over the next 15 years, Congress passed 69 entirely new 
laws (i.e., laws that do not reform or repeal any prior regulations of the same name), 
yielding an average of 4.8 new laws per year. 
 
The reform of existing laws, as well as the enactment of new ones, has been extensive. Of 
287 federal laws in force as of August 2015, nearly three-quarters have been subject to some 
modification since their passage, and two-thirds have been modified after 2010. One in six 
new laws passed during the period 2013–2015 was modified during those same years. 
There are no signs that the legislative activity is going to decrease in terms of rate and 
intensity over the coming years, which means that this phenomenon has become a part of 
the normal democratic reality of the country. 
 
To complete this overview of the legal modernization over the past decades, it is essential 
to note that this has been accompanied by an equally significant change in the field of 
justice. This change can be described as the migration of the judiciary branch—headed by 
Supreme Court of Justice—from the periphery to the center of the institutional space. This 
judicial transition occurred on four axes, which we may call “judicialization,” 
“specialization,” “professionalization,” and “social opening.”  Of these four axes, the most 
important one undoubtedly is judicialization, since it significantly expanded the judiciary 
branch’s sphere of action and influence. Starting in 1995, the Supreme Court of Justice and 
other federal courts have become increasingly involved in issues that had previously been 
formally excluded from their jurisdiction—such as electoral issues—or that were not 
covered by court rulings for political reasons, such as conflicts between federal or local 
branches or between the different levels of government (known as “constitutional 
controversies”). The participation of the judiciary in the definition and expansion of the 
basic rights of citizens (Súarez Ávila 2014) has also been growing, frequently on polemical 
social issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, and personal consumption of illegal 
drugs, among others. What is more, the dynamics of the political and legal changes have 
increasingly compelled the federal judiciary to address complex issues of public policy, 
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such as economic competition and telecommunications. Specialized courts have been 
established to address these matters in a technical and professional manner. 
 
The expansion of the field of action and influence of all the country’s courts—not only of 
those at the federal level—has consequences that are still not entirely visible or predictable, 
although they will significantly affect the outcome of the recent reforms, an issue that we 
will analyze in more detail in the following section. 
 
The Energy Reform of 2013–2014 and the Challenges of Institutional 
Effectiveness 
 
In this section, we will examine some of the institutional challenges that the energy reform 
of 2013–2014 faces. From this point of view, it is quite evident that the reform’s success 
now lies in the hands of the executive and judicial branches, since the legislative branch has 
already carried out the substantial task of passing the constitutional reform and 
implementing the laws. Two facts of great significance must be pointed out: First, 
democratic normalcy was plainly demonstrated during the legislative process. This is to say 
political forces no longer attempted to block the discussion of some changes, as had 
happened with previous labor and energy reforms.7 Instead, after deliberation and 
negotiations, Congress voted on and adopted the decision that was legitimately agreed 
upon by the majority. Second, when the restrictions on private investment in the energy 
sector were removed from the Constitution, the legal framework in force and effect was 
better aligned with the main orientation of the economic policy after 1982. Still, even 
though a clear contradiction between the Constitution and the new economic laws did not 
exist, there were still sufficient elements in the constitutional rules in favor of a statist, 
interventionist, and developmental interpretation by the courts. Furthermore, the 
existence of explicit constitutional restrictions, mainly in energy matters, provided very 
narrow margins for the modification of regulatory laws, as demonstrated by the oil reform 
in 2008. Even though the concept of the “economic stewardship of the state” has not 
disappeared from the constitutional text, there are now fewer elements to support a classic 
interventionist state policy. At the same time, other concepts are being strengthened, such 
as the economic function of public power based on impartial regulation and the creation of 
fair conditions in an open market. 
 
The Role of the Executive Branch and the Dilemmas of Economic Regulation 
The recent institutional development, as described above, has not yet provided the desired 
results. Some of the new institutions have not yet proven their effectiveness, which creates 
mistrust among the general public and therefore generates considerable pressure in favor 
of new changes and adjustments. While it is true that most of these institutions have not 
had sufficient time to develop and be consolidated, their instability and ineffectiveness is 
also due to a circumstance that is rarely mentioned: the recognition of the crushing and 
nearly absolute power enjoyed by the president has led to the rather simplistic idea that to 
achieve a full democratic transition and establish a legitimate and efficient institutional 
apparatus, depriving him of power and transferring it to other, presumably impartial, 
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bodies would be sufficient. However, the reforms that weakened the power of the president 
also unraveled the threads of political and administrative control that he had previously 
held; this unraveling has been a significant contributor to the crisis experienced in some 
institutional quarters, such as in public safety. The new institutions have not managed to 
recover comparable control and are not subject to effective scrutiny or democratic 
accountability. 
 
These circumstances indicate that while the presidency was strong, the state was not. This 
has turned the process of building new institutions into a complex affair. Similarly, it is 
difficult to redefine the new political role that ought to be played by the presidency in 
terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. A failure to understand the role of the presidency 
has led to an attempt to delegate the design and operation of new institutions solely to the 
other two branches—with the support of civil society at the national and international 
levels—without acknowledging the still central role occupied by the presidency in the 
political system. It was thought that excluding the president (even from the appointment of 
members of various public authorities) would guarantee impartiality and efficiency; but in 
doing so, is the executive branch not thereby relieved of some of its legitimate tasks and 
responsibilities in the field of public policy? 
 
The multiplication in the number of autonomous bodies had the express intention of 
generating trust and legitimacy in the performance of some state functions, while at the 
same time preventing and limiting the authoritarian excesses of the executive branch. This 
intention is connected to an international trend that promotes the diversity and autonomy 
of administrative authorities, particularly those in charge of economic regulation, while it 
discourages direct political intervention by the government for the sake of the stability, 
continuity, and credibility of public policy. Within this context, it is considered that the 
prevalent technical and professional criteria for evaluating the function of such authorities 
are sufficient to ensure their independence and efficiency (Comisión Federal de Mejora 
Regulatoria 2011). 
 
If this is the case, what are the terms under which the executive branch can and should be 
involved in the process of public policy? If the president cannot subject the administrative 
apparatus or economic and social regulation to the directives of political opportunity, how 
can the rationality and effectiveness of political leadership in the executive branch be 
guaranteed? Is there a way to combine effectiveness with legitimacy in the administrative 
implementation of public policies, particularly those related to sustainable economic 
development? 
 
In the case of Mexico—and in spite of the democratic reforms of the past decades—the 
nucleus of presidential power has been neither been reformed nor democratized.  Perhaps 
the reality of the political environment may no longer favor or even permit excess insofar 
as the exercise of presidential power is concerned; however, it is certain that the central 
elements of authoritarian presidentialism essentially remain intact. Based on this, as has 
been emphasized by some authors (Valadés 2008), it is necessary to balance presidential 
power through the incorporation of some parliamentary elements. This 
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“parliamentarization” of the presidential system does not imply decreasing the power of 
the president, but rather strengthening his legitimacy and efficiency in a democratic 
environment, since it promotes legislative support for his government program. Since the 
efficacy of a political system increasingly depends on cooperation and coordination 
between the branches of power, the main role of the executive branch will not be to merely 
make unilateral political decisions but rather to negotiate and promote a government 
program that can receive support from the other two branches and from society. 
 
This task is visibly unfinished in Mexico, although steps in this direction have been taken 
through the constitutional reforms of 2014, which introduced congressional approval of 
the appointment of some federal cabinet members, as well as the possibility of a coalition 
government. However, this possibility has not yet been put to the test and is limited with 
respect to what a truly renewed institutional scheme would require. 
 
These preliminary reflections define the perspective by which we will proceed to analyze 
the relationships between the executive branch, the regulatory agencies, and the new 
“productive state companies” (empresas productivas del estado [EPEs] in Spanish). Based on 
this analysis, we can conclude that even though there is a tendency toward increasing the 
autonomy of both regulatory bodies and public companies, the energy reform has this 
virtue: it has not deprived the executive branch of the mechanisms of coordination and 
influence that will ensure functionality and accountability with regard to decisions on 
energy matters. 
 
The energy reform incorporated a reference in the constitutional text to the “coordinated 
regulatory bodies in energy matters” (organismos reguladores coordinados en material energética 
[ORCMEs] in Spanish), which are the National Hydrocarbons Commission (created in 2008) 
and the Regulatory Commission for Energy (first established in 1993). The law regulating 
both organizations8 no longer defines them as “decentralized bodies” of the Ministry of 
Energy, although it makes it clear that they continue to be a part of the executive branch and 
serve for the exercise of “its powers of technical and economic regulation in matters of 
electricity and hydrocarbons… for the purpose of promoting the efficient development of the 
energy sector” (Article 4 of the Law on the Coordinated Regulatory Bodies in Energy 
Matters). The law modified the composition of the ORCMEs by increasing the number of 
commissioners from five to seven and reforming the requirements of professional 
knowledge and independence to which they must comply; it also modified the procedure for 
their appointment, which no longer rests only with the president but now also with the 
Senate. The law also increased the authorities and responsibilities of the ORCMEs and 
detailed all matters related to their operation—including issues of growing public relevance, 
such as transparency and the fight against corruption. 
 
However, the most important element of this law is that it creates the Coordinating Council 
of the Energy Sector, which is composed of the heads of the ORCMEs along with those in 
charge of the relevant agencies in the central administration. According to Article 21 of the 
law, the council has the responsibility to: 
• Inform the ORCMEs of the energy policy established by the Ministry of Energy 
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• Issue recommendations regarding aspects of the energy policy and programs 
from the executive branch to be included in the annual programs of the 
ORCMEs 
• Analyze recommendations and proposals by the ORCMEs regarding the energy 
policy and programs of the executive branch 
• Establish rules for their own operation 
• Implement systems of shared information and institutional cooperation  
• Analyze specific cases that may affect the development of the public policies of 
the executive branch in energy matters and propose mechanisms for 
coordination, among others 
 
Although the ORCMEs enjoy broad autonomy, their participation in the Coordinating 
Council ensures an indirect, although strong, influence of the executive branch on these 
regulatory organizations.9 
 
The cases of PEMEX and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) are similar. They are 
no longer organizations directly controlled by the executive branch; rather, they have 
become EPEs, which means that they have autonomy to conduct business in accordance 
with corporate policies and criteria. These policies are reflected, for example, by the 
criteria, requirements, and procedures for the appointment of the members of their 
respective boards of directors. 
 
The energy reform has also established other organizations such as the National Center for 
Hydrocarbon Information, the National Agency of Industrial Safety and Environmental 
Protection in the Hydrocarbon Sector, the National Natural Gas Control Center, and the 
National Energy Control Center—all of which are still important in energy matters, though 
they have a lesser degree of autonomy. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that the energy reform defined the main functions and 
responsibilities of the executive branch quite clearly—among them the exploration and 
extraction of hydrocarbons—without depriving it of the regulatory instruments that are 
indispensable for fulfilling these tasks. In addition, indirect control over the regulatory 
bodies and the EPEs—as well as a more complex legal environment of a contractual, 
competitive, and nonhierarchical nature—will contribute to strengthening the role of the 
executive branch in defining and negotiating of public policies more so than direct 
economic administration. 
 
Regulatory Density and Judicial Function 
Mexico’s judiciary will play a central role in resolving the complex economic and legal 
issues raised by the energy reform of 2013–2014. The first item relevant to this analysis is 
the density and complexity of the new legislative framework for the energy sector. Five of 
the new laws that were approved based on the reform contain almost three times the 
number of articles and nearly four times the number of words than the laws they replaced 
(see Table 4 in the appendix). This may seem quite paradoxical, since the constitutional 
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reforms were concerned with the deregulation of the energy sector. Restrictions regarding 
private investment in the sector were removed; however, on the legislative level, this 
required a very thorough and detailed “regulation,” considering the legal and economic 
complexity of the new system of organization for the industry. 
 
From the perspective of the administration of justice, it could be assumed that due to the 
increased level of detail in the legislative system, many court disputes would be avoided. 
However, this will not necessarily be the case, for two reasons: First, the energy reform 
represents a change with profound implications, one that redefines the structure and 
operation of an entire economic sector and its relationship to the state. Without a doubt, 
there will be novel and complex legal issues that will frequently require court rulings. The 
second reason is that the incorporation of a new cast of private actors who will not only 
attach themselves to public organizations, but also to other private players, may also 
become the source of numerous and difficult court disputes. 
 
The plurality of legal matters involved in the energy reform means that there may be some 
intervention by the federal courts as well as by state-level entities—both those belonging to 
the judiciary branch as well as those outside it, such as the administrative and agricultural 
courts. The complexity in terms of the jurisdiction and organization of the judiciary 
branch in Mexico will necessitate a learning process to resolve the legal issues raised by the 
reform, and achieving guidelines that are more or less uniform in terms of court policy will 
not be simple. In this respect, it will be up to the judiciary branch—and the Supreme Court 
of Justice in particular—to establish decision-making criteria that will effectively guide the 
actions of lower courts in order to guarantee legal security for the political and economic 
players involved. It will take some time and will test the new system’s ability to resolve 
contradictory interpretations by different courts (known as contradicciones de tesis in 
Spanish). This system came into effect in 2013 and is only now beginning to operate.  
 
Finally, there are the advantages and limitations of writs of amparo, which can contribute to 
the solution of legal issues in energy matters. A writ of amparo is an instrument whose 
purpose is to invalidate rules and actions by the state that are contrary to the state’s 
constitution and laws. A writ of amparo is a last-resort means of objection, used when the 
ordinary administrative and court recourses have been exhausted. It is frequently used by 
defendants to put a hold on government actions and drag out court procedures. 
 
In the case of issues related to economic competition, telecommunications, and now 
energy, orders and acts by the regulatory bodies are not submitted to the ordinary 
administrative courts but can only be challenged through amparo proceedings, without the 
possibility of provisionally suspending the effects of the challenged law or action. This has 
the evident purpose of preventing regulators’ policies and decisions from being blocked; it 
also means that despite the existence of specialized courts, orders and acts performed by 
the regulators may be subjected to judicial review criteria that are not purely technical or 
economic in nature. For example, the constitutional amendments of June 2011 reinforced 
the centrality of human rights, as guaranteed both in the constitution and international 
treaties, as a guiding principle for all public authorities—especially for the Supreme Court, 
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as the highest judicial authority in the country. Therefore, if the courts decide, for reasons 
that are perfectly legitimate, that the protection of the players’ human rights—for example, 
in terms of the environment—justifies the imposition of restrictions and limits on 
economic action in the energy sector, there may well be unforeseeable and perhaps 
undesirable economic consequences. However, there is no need for particular concern in 
this respect, since court intervention in the definition and redefinition of public policy is 
normal  and must be accepted in any democratic society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In his book, Francis Fukuyama (2014) conducts an analysis of the performance of 
institutions within modern political orders. According to Fukuyama, the political order in 
contemporary societies is established by three sets of institutions: the state, understood as a 
hierarchical organization that monopolizes the legitimate use of force within a specific 
territory; the rule of law, defined as a set of rules of conduct that reflects a broad consensus 
in society and that is obligatory for even the most powerful political players; and democratic 
accountability, understood as the existence of mechanisms that serve to evaluate the 
behavior of public authorities. 
 
These three sets of institutions are complementary, although tension does exist among 
them—which we will not examine at this time. What is relevant for our argument is the 
idea that the historical sequence in which they appear has consequences for a given 
institution’s development and effectiveness. According to Fukuyama, the first institution 
that emerged in Western, primarily European, societies was the rule of law, a developed 
legal order that preceded state-building itself and served to limit the power of even the 
most absolute of monarchs. A second phase, the construction of a centralized state with a 
professional and impartial bureaucracy, set the basis for the current stage, which has 
consisted of the democratization of power.10  
 
According to this outline, Mexico appears to have historically followed the trajectory of 
advanced European nations. First, a legal system emerged and was delineated. Its roots are 
found in the colonial era, since the conquest by the Spanish was accompanied and justified 
by legal forms. Some of the traits of colonial law continue until today, such as formality, 
centrality, corporatism, and a pretense of complying with rules. We may say that in this 
way, a “modern legal proto-culture” was established. 
 
When independence was achieved, there was neither a fully centralized state nor any 
constitutional rules, at least not in the modern sense. The struggles that occurred between 
the liberal and conservative factions do not conceal the fact that both parties desired 
something similar: the establishment of a modern constitution with a declaration of rights 
and the separation of powers. This task was substantively concluded with the 1857 
Constitution; as we have seen, the construction of a centralized state capable of 
administering economic development was not initiated properly until the administration 
of General Díaz. This construction was interrupted by the Mexican Revolution, although it 
was resumed in full force during the 1930s. Democratization, however, took much longer 
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to arrive. It started timidly during the 1970s (with the so-called Political Reform of 1977), 
becoming more powerful in the 1990s and continuing until the present day. Today, 
electoral democracy is a part of the country’s status quo, and other elements such as 
transparency and accountability are in the process of being incorporated. 
 
If this interpretation is correct, then why are we currently seeing public insecurity, 
violence, and corruption—undeniably signs of “political decay,” as termed by Fukuyama—
in Mexico? This is due to the fact that events in this country have not completely followed 
the sequence that we have sketched out. Recall that state-building in Mexico during the 
20th century actually translated into the formation of a strong presidency, which 
prevented the development of other strong state institutions. Therefore, the construction 
of other institutions was not completed in a manner that would result in the subsequent 
stage—as in the Fukuyama model—but instead, three sets of institutions, the “state,” the “rule 
of law,” and “democratic accountability,” are under construction at the same time. In other 
words, it is the unfinished process of construction of a modern and democratic political 
order that creates great complexity and uncertainty; therefore, it is not possible to make 
any predictions regarding its ultimate outcome. 
 
However, there are clear signs that the process of economic, political, and legal transitions 
that Mexico is currently undergoing has indeed led to a qualitative social transformation. 
Mexican sociologist René Millán (2008) maintains that this transition has not only 
consisted of economic liberalization and political democratization of the country, but also 
of a transformation in the manner in which society itself is integrated. We have moved from a 
system highly integrated by the state—and dominated by the presidency—to a differentiated 
system, without a functional primacy or central character of the state. There is no longer a 
single party or a single organization that can exercise absolute control over the institutional 
apparatus. Increasing institutional complexity causes a lack of visible coordination and 
disorderly, chaotic phenomena that are structurally irreversible. Following this line, we 
may affirm that the transition has caused greater differentiation and reciprocal autonomy 
between the political and legal systems; this is shown in the new role of an independent 
judiciary and the insistent discourse surrounding the need to strengthen the rule of law and 
legal culture (Fix-Fierro and López Ayllón 2001).  
 
The nondisruptive character of this transformation process has had positive 
consequences—for example, a degree of continuity and stability in the midst of 
institutional change—although there have also been negative effects. Among the latter, we 
may cite the unfinished and uncertain nature of the process of change, as well as a certain 
lack of understanding regarding its nature and depth. Some political and social players 
continue to believe that nothing has essentially changed since 1982; that is, they maintain 
that the true transition has not even started yet. Others cannot determine when it began, 
whether it is still going on, or whether it has already been completed. 
 
In a democratic society, the ultimate guarantor of democratic accountability lies with civil 
society. As numerous authors have underscored, under a minimally democratic system, the 
political players and institutions will end up carrying out the wishes and the will of society 
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over the long term (Aguilar Camín and Castañeda 2011). In Mexico, the past few years have 
shown that the political class is sensitive to both national and international public opinion 
and responds to it—at least on some level. It can then be assumed that the nationalistic 
social conscience and the prevailing corporatist inheritance—which are still present in 
Mexico, fed by the revolutionary mythology—could end up slowing down the effects of 
the energy reform. However, the fact that the reforms have been quickly approved by 
Congress is a signal that Mexican society has essentially passed this stage of nationalistic 
social conscience and prevailing corporatist view. While unanimity certainly is not present, 
political disagreements are increasingly handled in a normal and civilized manner. 
 
Nobody can ensure that the economic gamble underlying the 2013–2014 energy reform 
will achieve the desired or expected success. The international environment is too volatile 
to make predictions with a high degree of certainty. However, there are elements that 
demonstrate that Mexico has gradually been building the institutions that will be able to 
perform governmental operations with reasonable effectiveness. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Constitutional Reforms by Government Period (1982 to July 10, 2015) 
 
 
President 
 
Period 
 
 
Number 
of 
Reforms 
 
 
Percentage 
of Total 
(%) 
 
Presidential 
Decrees 
 
Length of 
Const.  
Articles 
(number 
of words) 
 
Difference 
(number 
of words) 
 1921–1982 213   35.1   98 29,938  
Miguel de la 
Madrid 
1982–1988   66   10.3   19 34,916 + 4,978 
Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari 
1988–1994   55     8.6   15 36,856 + 1,940 
Ernesto 
Zedillo 
1994–2000   77   12.0   18 42,802 + 5,946 
Vicente Fox 2000–2006   31     4.8   17 45,365 + 2,653 
Felipe 
Calderón 
2006–2012 110   17.2   38 54,815 + 9,450 
Enrique Peña 
Nieto 
2012–2015   90   14.0   20 66,073 + 11,258 
Total  642 100.0 225   
 
Source: Author’s own work using data of the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Union, 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx. 
 
Notes: The presidential term begins on December 1 of the first year and ends on November 30 of the 
final year. The column labeled “Extension” refers to the approximate extension of the constitutional 
text measured in words at the end of the respective period and does not include the preamble or any 
transitional articles. The original text of the 1917 Constitution was approximately 21,000 words in 
length. The column “Reforms” was quantified in the following manner: one reform is considered as 
the change of one article in one amending decree, which could include multiple modifications to the 
same article.  
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Table 2. National Bodies, Organizations, and Systems Incorporated into the Political 
Constitution of the United Mexican States since December 1, 1982 
 
Name Year of 
Establishment/ 
Constitutional 
Reform 
Nature Constitutional 
Article(s)  
National Anticorruption System 2015 National system 113 
National System of Democratic 
Planning 
1983, 2013, 2015 National system 26, A, Paragraph 3 
*Federal Court of 
Administrative Justice 
1967, 2015 Administrative 
court with full 
autonomy in 
handing down its 
rulings 
73, Section XXIX-H 
Office of the Superior Auditor 
of the Federation 
1999, 2008, 2015 Supervisory body 
of the Chamber of 
Deputies of the 
Congress of the 
Union 
79 
National Archives System 2014 National system 73, Section XXIX-T 
*National Institute of 
Transparency, Access to 
Information, and Protection of 
Personal Data 
2014 Autonomous 
Constitutional 
Organization 
(OCA) 
6, A,  Section VIII 
Federal/National Electoral 
Institute 
1990, 1993, 1994, 
1996, 2007, 2014 
OCA  41, Section V 
Electoral Court of the Federal 
Judiciary 
1990, 1993, 1996, 
2007, 2014 
Specialized 
jurisdictional body 
with maximum 
authority in this 
matter 
94 and 99 
Office of the Attorney-General 
of the Republic 
1994, 2014 Autonomous 
public body 
102, A 
National Institute for the 
Evaluation of Education 
2013  OCA 3, Section IX 
*National Council for the 
Evaluation of the Social 
Development Policy 
2013 OCA 26, C 
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National System of Educational 
Evaluation 
2013 National system 3, Section IX  
Public Radio Broadcasting 
System of the Mexican State 
2013 Decentralized 
public body 
6, B, Section V 
*National Hydrocarbons 
Commission 
2013 Coordinated 
regulatory body in 
energy matters 
28, Paragraph 8  
*Regulatory Commission for 
Energy 
2013 Coordinated 
regulatory body in 
energy matters 
28, Paragraph 8  
*Federal Commission of 
Economic Competition 
2013 OCA 28, Paragraph 14 
*Federal Institute of 
Telecommunications 
2013 OCA 28, Paragraph 15 
*National Human Rights 
Commission 
1992, 1999, 2011 OCA 102, B 
National Public Safety System 1994, 2008 National system 21, Paragraph 10 
National System of Statistical 
and Geographic Information 
2006 National system 26, B 
*National Institute of Statistics 
and Geography 
2006 OCA 26, B 
Council of the Federal Judiciary 1994, 1999 Administrative, 
supervisory, and 
disciplinary body 
of the federal 
judiciary  
94 and 100 
Office of the Legal Counselor of 
the Federal Government 
1994 Agency of the 
federal executive 
branch 
20, Paragraph 3 
*Banco de México 1993 OCA 28, Paragraph 6  
Agrarian courts 1992 Autonomous 
administrative 
courts with full 
jurisdiction 
27, Section XIX, 
Paragraph 2 
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*Procurator for Agrarian 
Matters 
1992 Body in charge of 
administering 
justice in agrarian 
matters 
27, Section XIX, 
Paragraph 3  
 
Source: Author’s own work based on the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, 
according to the text in force and effect as of July 10, 2015. 
 
Notes: The bodies or organizations marked with an asterisk (*) had already been created by law or 
decree prior to their incorporation in the constitutional text. OCA stands for “autonomous 
constitutional organization” (even though this denomination is of common use, it does not imply that 
these organizations all have the same degree of constitutional autonomy). 
 
 
Table 3. Number of federal laws in force and/or amended as of August 31, 2015 
 
Period of 
Publication  
New 
Laws 
(A) 
% Amended 
(B) 
Amended 
since 2010 
(C) 
% 
(B/A) 
% 
(C/A) 
Until 1970   40 13.9   33   24 82.5 60.0 
1971–1976   15   5.2   11     8 73.3 53.3 
1977–1982   11   3.8     7     7 63.6 63.6 
1983–1988   21   7.3   19   17 90.5 80.9 
1989–1994   28   9.8   25   22 89.3 78.6 
1995–2000   33 11.5   32   32 97.0 97.0 
2001–2006   59 20.6   48   40 81.3 67.8 
2007–2012   50 17.4   32   30 64.0 60.0 
2013–August 2015   30 10.5     5    5 16.7 16.7 
Total 287 100 212 185 73.9 64.4 
 
Source: Author’s own work using data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Mexican 
Union, http://www.diputados.gob.mx. 
 
Notes: This table does not reflect the Income Tax Act, the Budget of Expenditures of the 
Federation, the Regulations of the Congress of the Union and its chambers, the Bylaws of the 
Government of the Federal District, and the Basic Law of the Office of the Attorney General of 
Justice of the Federal District.  
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Table 4. Comparison of Laws in Energy Matters 
 
Repealed Laws Articles Number 
(words) 
Number 
(words) 
Articles 
(number) 
Current Laws 
Law of the National 
Hydrocarbons 
Commission (2008) 
15 2,600 
7,000 42 
Law of the 
Coordinated 
Regulatory Bodies  
in Energy Matters 
(2014) 
Law of the Regulatory 
Commission for 
Energy (2008) 
13 2,300 
Law of the Public 
Electric Energy Service 
(1992)  
47 6,900 
21,700 121 
Law of the Federal 
Electricity 
Commission (2014) 
28,000 169 
Electrical Industry 
Law (2014) 
Law of Petróleos 
Mexicanos (2008) 
73 14,700 
20,500 
118 
Law of Petróleos 
Mexicanos (2014)  
Law regulating Article 
27 in the Oil Sector 
(1958) 
16 4,300 131 
Hydrocarbons Law 
(2014) 
 
Totals 
 
 
164 
 
30,800 
 
77,200 
 
581 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work using data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Mexican 
Union, http://www.diputados.gob.mx. 
 
Notes: Years refer to the original date of publication of the laws. The data regarding the number of 
articles and the approximate word counts include subsequent reforms. The comparison did not 
include the new Hydrocarbons Income Act or the Law of the National Agency of Industrial Safety 
and Environmental Protection in the Hydrocarbon Sector (2014). 
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Endnotes 	
1 Thus the title of the memoir on his presidency that De la Madrid published a few years 
later (De la Madrid 2004). 
 
2 There are at least two other significant sociological approaches to “world society”: one 
developed during the 1970s and early 1980s by the Swiss sociologist Peter Heintz, and that 
taken by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann and his disciples, especially Rudolf Stichweh. 
See Heintz and Greve (2005), Luhmann (1982, 1997) and Stichweh (2000).  
 
3 In his examination of the administration of General Bustamante (1830–1832) in light of the 
Constitution of 1824, Lucas Alamán—one of the ideological leaders of the conservative party—
emphasized the contradictions between the model that was followed (the Constitution of the 
United States), the spirit that was supposed to be infused into it (that of the Cádiz Constitution 
of 1812), and the colonial laws that still prevailed (Alamán 2012, 172-73). 
 
4 By 1921, Mexico was already one of the main global producers of oil and was responsible 
for a quarter of worldwide production (Álvarez de la Borda 2005, 72-73). Another polemical 
issue between the Mexican government and petroleum companies was related to taxes, 
which the latter had to pay for the production and sale of hydrocarbons. 
 
5 There is no doubt that even though it would receive the constitutional legacy of liberalism 
of the 19th century, the 1917 Constitution was illiberal in spirit. This spirit manifests itself 
through the incorporation of some elements that Martín Díaz y Díaz (1997, 1999) has 
characterized as “ambivalent” and belonging to a “heterodox constitutionalism” (such as all 
land, water, and subsoil resources belonging to the state). These elements, acknowledging 
“certain premodern and authoritarian peculiarities” of the country, provided the 1917 
Constitution with a stability and political viability that the preceding constitutions did not 
enjoy. See Díaz y Díaz (1997, 1999) and Aguilar Rivera (2010, 71 et seq.). It should 
nonetheless be added that although the “liberal core” of the Constitution was shut down 
during a good part of the 20th century, the transition over the past decades has resulted in 
a return to that core. This is one of the reasons that it has not been necessary to write an 
entirely new constitution.  
 
6 Nationalization of the electrical industry was completed in 1960—not by expropriation 
but through the purchase of private companies’ shares, in most cases of foreign companies 
or subsidiaries that were providing the service. Regarding both nationalization processes, 
see Ovalle Favela (2007). 
 
7 The energy reform of 2013–2014 has many antecedents, considering that limited attempts 
were made during the 1990s to open up the electrical and oil industries to the market and 
to private investment. However, until 2013, political forces blocked any wide-ranging 
change, refusing to discuss even the possibility of modifying the constitutional text.  
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8 See the Law of the Coordinated Regulatory Bodies in Energy Matters published in the 
Official Gazette of the Federation, dated August 11, 2014. 
 
9 A regulatory organization that will also be very important for the energy reform is the new 
Federal Competition Commission, which was granted constitutional autonomy in 2013. 
 
10 However, Fukuyama underscores that there are some modern societies, such as the 
United States, where democratization occurred before the building of a strong state. 
During the 19th century, one consequence thereof was the emergence of a clientelistic and 
quite corrupt political system that has proved difficult to eradicate through an independent 
and efficient public administration, both in the United States and other societies where 
democratization occurred before the construction of a strong central government. 
